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The Clash of Empires: Regulating Technological Threats  
to Civil Society 
By Tracey Leigh Dowdeswell* and Nachshon (Sean) Goltz** 
*Faculty, Humanities & Social Sciences, Douglas College (Canada) 




This paper examines the regulation of technology platform companies – those companies that 
provide a platform for user-generated media content. These companies play an increasingly 
dominant role in the global flow of news and information. In doing so, platform companies play 
a crucial role in modern civic life, by deciding which content will reach users, engage the 
public’s attention, and be deemed credible. It is therefore crucial that we choose means of 
regulation that foster democratic values and robust civic engagement. In this paper we focus on 
the regulation of ‘computational propaganda,’ including misinformation and ‘fake news,’ the rise 
of synthetic media and so-called ‘deep fakes,’ and novel forms of algorithmic injustice, such as 
the manipulation of search engine results and their effect on elections. We argue that many 
existing regulations fall short in that they adopt an approach that views regulation as a battle 
between two competing powers, or ‘empires’ – that of the regulatory state versus the big tech 
companies. Accordingly, they approach regulation as a means of redistributing power between 
these two players, while discounting the end user, and they often involve unjustified restrictions 
of free speech through the imposition of content controls. We propose instead three guidelines 
for platform governance that serve as goals or guideposts to regulating computational 
propaganda without the need for content controls, these being: 1) transparency – about the 
sources of information, their funding, and their credibility, 2) the promotion of decentralization 
and user control over flows of information, and 3) efforts to enhance media literacy and 
credibility. We need to choose methods of regulating technology that foster democratic rights 
without empowering the kind of censorship that goes along with censorship and content controls. 
 
 
Keywords: Regulation of technology, information governance, media literacy, 
computational propaganda, fake news, synthetic media, technology and civil society.  
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1. Introduction: Regulation & The Clash of Empires 
The Mongol Empire laid siege to Baghdad in 1258 A.D., overthrowing the Abbasid Caliphate, 
and sacking the city that had been the centre of Islamic cultural life for very nearly five hundred 
years. To impose the rule of the new empire, the Mongols first destroyed the trappings of the old: 
they executed its Caliph and eliminated its royal family; they decimated its armies and its 
population; they tore apart the books in its libraries and destroyed the august House of Wisdom. 
There were stories of Mongol soldiers using the vellum torn from priceless manuscripts for their 
sandals.1 The Mongols sought to dominate the inhabitants by outlawing kosher and halal 
butcheries, and they prohibited the people from refusing to eat Mongol foods.2  
But the wholesale destruction of the old empire by the new was not – as it never is – the 
whole story. The new regime needs to incorporate portions of the old to consolidate its power. 
The technologically advanced Mongol Empire quickly came to dominate Central Asia: the 
introduction of stirrups, the improvement of light cavalry, the cultivation of horse milk as a 
source of nutrition all gave Mongol horsemen the advantage on long campaigns across the 
steppes. But the new empire had little experience in collecting taxes, maintaining order, or 
administering a cosmopolitan empire with its great bureaucracy and far-flung possessions.   
The Mongol Khan of Soltaniyeh – located near the Caspian Sea in northern Iran – needed 
to employ Persian scholars to help him administer his corner of the empire. The chief of these 
was Rashid Al-Din, a highly educated scion of the old elite. Al-Din was a cosmopolitan scholar 
and politician of international renown. Originally from a Persian Jewish family, he converted to 
Islam and rose to become the Grand Visier of the Mongol Khanate. The story is told that the 
 
1. Stewart A. P. Murray, The Library: An Illustrated History (New York: Skyhorse Publishing), 54. 
2. Johan Elverskog, Buddhism and Islam on the Silk Road (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 
228. 
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second Khan, Mahmoud Ghazan, not only made Al-Din kneel before him throughout their 
meetings, but would make him stand behind his chair during state banquets; if the Visier’s 
service pleased him, Khan Ghazan might toss him a piece of meat (non-Halal, of course) over his 
shoulder.3 
What does this historic transregnum tell us about our present situation? As in the past, we 
are faced with a rising power that is technologically sophisticated, but lacks an administrative 
architecture. The new power therefore depends a great deal on the expertise, the cooperation and 
even the complicity of the existing elite at the same time as it seeks their domination – and 
occasional humiliation. There are lessons in this for our own time, as we seek to use old political 
and legal structures to regulate the rising power of technology platform companies and their 
influence over civic life. We argue that it is wise to see these as two facets of the same ecosystem 
rather than competing powers. Our task is therefore not to distribute power between them, but to 
manage the broader econsystem of which they are a part, and so to promote its most optimal 
functioning.  
In our own time, this ecosystem is not a physical empire – with its possessions, its tax 
collectors and its armies – but the flows of information in a technological and highly complex 
digital landscape. The Mongols sought to control their new subjects through the destruction of 
the old culture and its values, and imposed controls over what kinds of foods the subjects could 
not eat – even going so far as to regulate what foods they must eat. This is a metaphor for the 
imposition of content controls on media in our own time – a time in which the shift in power and 
the governance task at hand is equally monumental. What is often lost in the broader debates 
over what information people should and should not access is the essential dignty of the end user 
 
3. John Glubb, Fate of Empires and Search for Survival (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1977), 11-12. 
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and their freedom to choose. Here, we place ths principle at the heart of our regulatory regime, 
and instead seek to govern platform companies in the manner that will best promote civic values 
and user choice.  
We begin with a brief examination of the U.S. anti-trust case against Microsoft as an 
example of the clash of the old and the new empires, one in which the struggle for power 
between the great players takes precedence over the struggle for democratic values and 
individual autonomy. We then look at three new technological domains that have the power to 
either strengthen or subvert the regulatory state, depending on the means we choose to regulate 
them. Together these are examples of what might be termed ‘computational propaganda,’ 
including misinformation and ‘fake news,’ the rise of synthetic media and so-called ‘deep fakes,’ 
and novel forms of algorithmic injustice, focusing specifically on the manipulation of search 
engine results and their effect on election results. We then examine various methods of 
governance to deal with these new technological challenges, to better determine which will 
empower the big players, and which will empower human beings – as users of technology, as 
consumers of media, as citizens of democratic states, as holders of rights, and as practitioners of 
civic values.  
In the final section, we propose three governance domains that serve as goals or guideposts 
to regulating computational propaganda without the need for content controls, these being: 1) 
transparency – about the sources of information, their funding, and their credibility, 2) user 
control over information and its decentralization away from large organizations, and 3) media 
literacy and efforts to enhance our ability to distinguish the credibility of the information we are 
consuming. We need to choose methods of regulating technology that foster democratic rights 
without empowering the kind of censorship that goes along with censorship and content controls, 
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lest we end up as spectators in a twenty-first century clash of empires, fighting for the scraps left 
under the table. 
 
2. Technology Platform Companies & Civic Life 
Technology companies provide platforms for many of the services we now need to 
participate in a modern economy. They control the global flow of information, they provide 
news, content, communication, culture, and social interaction for a large and increasing portion 
of the world’s peoples. The largest of the platform companies – Apple, Amazon, Google 
(Alphabet) and YouTube, Facebook and its subsidiaries Instagram and WhatsApp, as well as 
Twitter – hold a near-monopoly share of their markets.4 About 90% of all searches globally are 
done through Google; YouTube and Facebook video hold a majority – at about 89% – of the 
desktop online video market, while Facebook holds a majority of all social media log-ins.5  
Technology companies wield great economic power, and they dominate the shifting 
boundaries of our security and privacy in the digital sphere.6 As Moore states: 
These global technology giants now bestride our world like Colossi. We wake to their alarms. 
We sleep to the continual ping of messages arriving on their hardware and via their software. 
They have become integral to our communication, to our access to news and information, to 
our virtual identities.7 
Platform companies monitor and collect information about our online activities – Facebook 
tracks its users’ online activities even at times when they are not using its platform8 – all for the 
purpose of controlling and directing our behaviour to line up with corporate interests.  
 
4. Martin Moore, “Tech Giants and Civic Power,” Centre for the Study of Media, Communications and Power, 
King’s College London (April 2016), 3. 
5. Moore, “Tech Giants and Civic Power,” 13. 
6. Moore, “Tech Giants and Civic Power,” 3. 
7. Moore, “Tech Giants and Civic Power,” 10. 
8. Moore, “Tech Giants and Civic Power,” 10. 
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At the same time, the digital empire is closely aligned with the old empire of the nation 
state, and its bureaucratic and administrative apparatus. It supports state institutions at the same 
time as it relies on them for its legal and economic privileges. Some argue that the current U.S. 
President was elected with the help of media misinformation delivered on platform companies 
like  Facebook;9 others have voiced concerns about the power of America’s leading technology 
czar – and  the richest man in the world – when Jeff Bezos of Amazon closed a deal to provide 
$600 million worth of cloud computing to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.10 Meanwhile, 
Google has been accused of supporting Chinese military interests over those of America.11 
Platform companies have been accused of fostering the surveillance capabilities of illiberal 
regimes around the world and oppressing human rights.12  
Platform companies are now performing civil functions we would normally associate with 
state power. Facebook and Twitter have taken over some communications functions that are 
explicitly civic, including official communications during natural disasters, amber alerts, and 
extreme weather warnings.13 More than this, they now possess the “power to enable collective 
action, the power to communicate news, and the power to influence people’s vote.”14 But as 
Woolley and Howard point out, platform companies that once held out the promise of 
 
9. Hannah Jane Parkinson, “Click and Elect: How Fake News Helped Donald Trump Win a Real Election,” The 
Guardian, November 14, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/14/fake-news-donald-trump-
election-alt-right-social-media-tech-companies. 
10. Norman Solomon, “If Obama Orders the CIA to kill a U.S. Citizen, Amazon will Be a Partner in Assassination,” 
Alternet, February 12, 2014, http://www.alternet.org/print/news-amp-politics/if-obama-orders-cia-kill-us-citizen-
amazon-will-be-partner-assassination. 
11. Zak Doffman, “Google Accused by Top U.S. General and Senator of Supporting Chinese Instead of U.S. 
Military,” Forbes, March 16, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/03/16/google-accused-by-u-s-
general-and-senator-of-benefiting-chinese-instead-of-u-s-military/#1b5b83df1899 
12 See eg., Joe Odell, “Inside the Dark Web of the UAE’s Surveillance State,” Middle East Eye, February 27, 2018, 
https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/inside-dark-web-uaes-surveillance-state. This describes the company “Dark 
Matter”, and its close alliance with the UAE government to engage in mass surveillance, including accessing and 
blocking users’ social media content.  
13. Moore, “Tech Giants and Civic Power,” 27. 
14. Moore, “Tech Giants and Civic Power,” 4. 
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empowering users and fostering political action have betrayed this by their increasingly illiberal 
tendencies, stating that “social media can be used very effectively for propaganda and political 
control; surveillance capacities are running way ahead of our ability to catch up with civil 
liberties protections; and filter chambers are becoming entrenched and are sowing extremist 
beliefs and social divisions.”15 
Google’s algorithms decide what web pages take precedence at the top of the search 
rankings, and which ones will be buried on page 2 – and therefore nearly never clicked on. 
Amazon decides what books receive precedence in searches, which intellectual works are to be 
promoted and recommended to purchasers, and which will not. Facebook decides which news 
stories will be showcased in their Newsfeed, and which will be buried as ‘fake news.’ In the 
same way that the printed press and the nascent field of journalism altered the nature of 
governance and democracy from the eighteenth to twentieth centuries, so too will the digital 
communications landscape alter it for the twenty-first.16 This time, the players are much more 
powerful, more centralized, have a wider reach, and there are fewer of them. 
Moore provides a list of six ways in which tech companies are exercising civic power: 1) 
the power to command the public’s attention; 2) the power to communicate news and 
information; 3) the power to enable collective action; 4) the power to give people a voice; 5) the 
power to influence people’s vote; 6) the power to hold other powers to account.17 These 
companies play a dominant role as gatekeepers to information, and hence to public opinion – and 
even voting behavior. At the same time, novel forms of computational propaganda, combined 
 
15. Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard, “Introduction: Computational Propaganda Worldwide,” in 
Computational Propaganda: Political Parties, Politicians, and Political Manipulation on Social Media, ed. Samuel 
C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 3. 
16. Moore, “Tech Giants and Civic Power,” 26. 
17. Moore, “Tech Giants and Civic Power,” 24. 
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with the power and reach of the platform companies that distribute them, pose particular risks to 
these six domains of civic life. This in turn poses novel and distinct threats to democracy, and 
this is one of the greatest governance challenges we face in the coming decades.  
The methods we adopt to govern platform companies need to be chosen carefully if they 
are to promote democratic values and civic engagement. In controlling the flow of information, 
there is a risk that we will instead empower the state or its corporate proxies – through 
oppressive policies that violate free speech, enable government surveillance, and quash essential 
freedoms like debate and association. In this paper, we examine the regulation of technology 
platform companies through the lens of the clash of empires – between the technological empire 
of the platform companies, new media and Silicon Valley on the one hand, versus the old empire 
of the regulatory state and its administration on the other – to better identify regulatory responses 
that will empower citizens, and which will merely feed back into the power struggles between 
the tech giants and the state.  
 
3. Microsoft: Monopoly & The Clash of Empires 
In this section, we will briefly examine the U.S. anti-trust case against Microsoft as an example 
of the clash of the old and the new empires, in which the struggle for power between the great 
players takes precedence over the struggle for civic values and user choice. This will hold 
important lessons, as we examine the unique challenges that modern technologies are posing for 
democratic governance.  
The dominance of the technology empire globally is described as, “an almost unimaginable 
power to determine what we see, where we spend, how we perceive.”18 Legal scholars have 
 
18. Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information (Boston: 
Harvard University Press, 2016), page 98. 
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analogized this power to the rentier economy of medieval feudalism,19 in which “a small cadre of 
the lucky, the talented, and the ruthless are reaping huge returns from content put out by 
others.”20 From its capital in Silicon Valley, the technology empire controls the online world and 
its most valuable resource – information. It even has its own cryptocurrency and, some argue, its 
own religion.21 
Comparing wealth and ‘population’ between the two empires shows the striking rrach of 
the new one. Amazon’s market value is now about $797 billion, which would make it the 146th 
richest country if it were a nation state.22 Google has a market value of about $748 billion and 
controls 92% of the world’s search market.23 Facebook counts “one quarter of humanity as 
monthly active users,”24 and has a market value is $479 billion,25 not counting Instagram and 
Whatsapp which it also owns.26 In comparison, the U.S. has a debt of $70 trillion and population 
of only 500 million.27  
Google’s Revenue for 2018 was $136B, with almost 100K employees, bringing its Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita to $1.36M. Facebook has 40K employees and its revenue for 
 
19. Greg Lastowka, Virtual Justice: The New Laws of Online Worlds (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 153, 
discussing whether “virtual societies are premised on owner-user relationship similar to those between lords and 
feudal societies”); Bruce Schneier, “Feudal Security,” Schneier Blog, December 3, 2012, 
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/12/feudal_sec.html. 
20. Jaron Lanier, Who Owns the Future? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), page 99. 
21 Douglas Rushkoff, “The Anti-Human Religion of Silicon Valley,” Wired, December 12, 2018, 
https://medium.com/team-human/the-anti-human-religion-of-silicon-valley-ac37d5528683. 
22. Much Needed, “Amazon by the Numbers: Stats, User Base & Fun Facts,” Much Needed Blog (2018), 
https://muchneeded.com/amazon-statistics/. 
23. Lauren Feiner, “Amazon is the Most Valuable Public Company in the World After Passing Microsoft,” CNBC 
News, January 7, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/07/amazon-passes-microsoft-market-value-becomes-
largest.html. 
24. Gabriel Kahn, “Facebook’s Self-Deception,” International Policy Digest, January 25, 2018, 
https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/01/25/facebook-s-self-deception/. 
25. MarketWatch, “Facebook Worth $45 Billion More After Earnings Set it Up to Be Potential ‘Comeback Story of 
2019,’” MarketWatch, January 31, 2019, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/facebook-may-be-the-comeback-
story-of-2019-as-stock-soars-higher-2019-01-31. 
26. Dan Noyes, “The Top 20 Valuable Facebook Statistics – Updated July 2019,” Zephoria Digital Marketing 
Strategic Insights, Blog, July 2019, https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics/. 
27. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/17/investing/united-states-debt-risks/index.html 
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2018 was $55B bringing bringing its GNI per capita to $1.37M.28 Amazon revenue was $233B 
with 647K employees bringing its GNI per capita to $360K.29 At the same time, the American 
empire GNI per capita was only $63K. In fact, the tech empire’s combined GNI per capita is 
larger than the combined GNI per capita of the top 107 countries in the world.30 
 Struggles for dominance between these two empires are not new. The U.S. 2001 anti-trust 
action against Microsoft was an early battle between the more defensive-minded of the old 
empire, and one of the most aggressive and profitable companies of the new.31 In this case, the 
U.S. government accused Microsoft of illegally maintaining its monopoly position in the 
personal computing market primarily through the legal and technical restrictions it put on the 
abilities of manufacturers and users to uninstall Internet Explorer and use other programs such 
as Netscape and Java.  
In November 5, 1999 Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson issued his initial findings of fact, 
finding that Microsoft held monopoly power and used it to harm consumers, rivals, and other 
companies. Judge Jackson further ordered the break-up of Microsoft into two companies. 
Nonetheless, in June 28, 2001 a federal appeals court reversed the breakup order.32 
 There can be no doubt as to who won this battle. The case had little effect on Microsoft's 
behaviour. The fines, restrictions, and monitoring that the government imposed on the company 
were not enough to prevent it from further “abusing its monopolistic power.”33 This is no 
 
28 Daniel Priestley, Learn the Simple Equation That Tells You If Your Business Will Grow and Scale, (Sep 18, 2019), 
Entrepreneur, https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/337745 
29 J. Clement, Annual Net Revenue of Amazon from 2004 to 2019, (Feb 3, 2020), Statista, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/266282/annual-net-revenue-of-amazoncom/ 
30 List of Countries by GNI (PPP) per capita, Expedia, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GNI_(PPP)_per_capita 
31 United States v. Microsoft Corporation, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
32 U.S. v. Microsoft: Timeline, WIRED NEWS, Nov. 4, 2002, 
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/news/2002/11/35212 
33. Gregory T. Jenkins and Robert W. Bing, “Microsoft’s Monopoly: Anti-Competitive Behavior, Predatory Tactics, 
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surprise considering the architects of this legal arrangement and their approach towards the 
technology empire online territory.34  
 Judge Posner, the chief mediator in the Microsoft case, later rendered an important 
decision in the legal action taken against the online sex-trafficking website Backpage.com.35 In 
the Backpage case, Posner ruled in favour of the company, stating “What about old men who like 
to be seen with a young woman, right. That is an aspect of escort service, it’s not all sex.”36 
Judge Posner conceived of the problem as a struggle between two great and competing powers: 
corporate freedom of action and expression versus the government’s power to regulate and 
control that freedom. His task, then, was merely to pick which side would win, but without 
reflecting that approaching the problem in this way missed the opportunity to balance competing 
rights and responsibilities for technology users and citizens in a democratic polity. This is a clear 
example of legal actors empowering a company at the expense of the government and its power 
to regulate corporate actors in the interests of a vulnerable group.37 In this case, too, the company 
won, but what was lostwere the interests of the women and girls who were sexually exploited by 
the website and its customers.    
If we step out of the mindset of viewing technology regulation as a clash of empires – as a 
choice between greater freedom for corporations to earn profits or greater power for the 
regulatory state – we gain a focus on the needs of technology users, civic actors, the needs of the 
vulnerable, and the values that will best foster human rights and democratic practices. 
 
and the Failure of Governmental Will,” Journal of Business & Economics Research 5 (2007): 222. 
34 Chris Butts,The Microsoft Case 10 Years Later: Antitrust and New Leading "New Economy" Firms, 8 Nw. J. 
Tech. & Intell. Prop. 275 (2010). https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol8/iss2/5 
35 https://www.iamjanedoefilm.com/ 
36. Backpage.com LLC v. Tom Dart, Sherriff of Cook County, Illinois, No. 15-3047 U.S. 7th Circuit Court of 
Appeals, November 2015.  
37 Professor Lessig serving as “special master” in the Microsoft case, defended Google when it was described as a 
parasite extracting value created by others, saying that this is much like, “Leonardo da Vinci was just a ‘parasite’ 
upon the hard work of the paint makers.”  
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Empowering the state to regulate by suppressing freedoms and ignoring the vulnerable is a road 
that has long led to oppression and social injustice. On the other hand, empowering corporations 
can be equally oppressive, socially dysfunctional, and economically wasteful. As one former 
Facebook executive said, “the best minds of my generation are thinking about how to make 
people click ads.”38 
 
4.  Computational Propaganda: New Threats to Civic Society 
4.1 Misinformation: 
In this section, we describe three types of computational propaganda and how they are posing 
novel and as-yet unregulated threats to democratic values and civil society. We focus on three 
categories of computational propaganda that have been shown to pose serious and immediate 
risks: misinformation, synthetic media, and the search engine manipulation effect (SEME).  
 Computational propaganda encompasses much more than so-called ‘fake’ or ‘junk’ news. 
Woolley defines computational propaganda as “the use of algorithms, automation, and human 
curation to purposefully manage and distribute misleading information over social media 
networks.”39 The European Commission has defined disinformation as “all forms of false, 
inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause 
public harm or for profit.”40 Fake news publications are but one form of computational 
propaganda, and have been defined as those news stories that are “knowingly and intentionally 
 
38. Gloria Liou, “This is Silicon Valley,” OneZero, February 27, 2019, https://onezero.medium.com/this-is-silicon-
valley-3c4583d6e7c2. 
39. Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard, “Introduction: Computational Propaganda Worldwide,” in 
Computational Propaganda: Political Parties, Politicians, and Political Manipulation on Social Media, ed. Samuel 
C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 4. 
40. European Commission, “A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Disinformation” Report of the Independent High 
Level Group On Fake News and Online Disinformation (March 2018), 5. 
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false;”41 this excludes satire, as well as news stories that may not be accurate, but are sloppily 
produced rather than intentionally misleading.42 Computational propaganda tends to reference 
notorious public figures or controversial topics with the intention of generating clicks and going 
‘viral.’43 Fake news and disinformation are devised to capture attention – to generate views, 
clicks and advertising revenue – in an information ecosystem in which sensationalism, novelty, 
and revenues are the main incentives for communication, and not accuracy and civic 
responsibility.44  
Computational propaganda includes not only the production of false or misleading 
information, but also its distribution over the digital landscape and the context in which it is 
consumed and interpreted. Computational means of producing propaganda are in many ways a 
new iteration of an old practice: propaganda has long included communications that “deliberately 
subvert symbols, appealing to our baser emotions and prejudices and bypassing rational thought, 
to achieve the specific goals of its promoters.”45 Digital communication is more powerful than 
older methods of propagandizing: it is cheaper to produce and more efficient to spread, while 
promoting much higher levels of personalization and engagement with users. At the same time, 
computational propaganda is hidden, automated, and largely anonymous, making these methods 
much more challenging to regulate.”46 As referred to this in the artificial media laws theory,  the 
more engaging is the particular media, the more it will take over the imagination and cognitive 
reasoning of the user, rendering them less able to judge the credibility of the content.47 
 
41. David O. Klein and Joshua R. Wueller, “Fake News: A Legal Perspective,” Journal of Internet Law 20, no. 10 
(2017): 6. 
42. Klein, “Fake News: A Legal Perspective,” 6. 
43. Klein, “Fake News: A Legal Perspective,” 6. 
44 Oreste Pollicino and Elettra Bietti, “Truth and Deception Across the Atlantic: A Roadmap of Disinformation in 
the U.S. and Europe,” Italian Journal of Public Law 11, no. 1 (2019): 46. 
45 Woolley, “Introduction: Computational Propaganda Worldwide,” 5. 
46 Woolley, “Introduction: Computational Propaganda Worldwide,” 7. 
47 Nachshon Goltz, and Tracey Dowdswell, The Imaginationless Generation: Lessons from Ancient Culture in 
 / TECHNOEMPIRE / 14 
 
Computational propaganda also employs wholly novel methods of producing and 
distributing misinformation. One such method is the use of automated systems, known as ‘bots.’ 
Bots are particularly engaging and persuasive – many can even have seemingly genuine 
conversations with users – and so they are very effective at promoting or discrediting political 
messages and policy positions.48 Bots can work to create or destroy an illusion of popularity and 
consensus – manipulating to their advantage our inborn tendency to follow the herd.49 In this 
way, they are very effective in both facilitating and impeding political organizing. The related 
practice known as ‘astroturfing’ uses this same principle to create fake grassroots movements 
that appear genuine and highly popular50 – all for the purposes of political persuasion, changing 
votes, and “nudging” mass behaviour.  
The spread and consumption of misinformation through platform companies is as crucial a 
problem as its actual content. As of 2017, 25% of all Americans obtained their news from social 
media sites, up substantially from 15% just four years earlier.51 Facebook and Google in 
particular are now major news platforms; about 40% of Americans are getting their political 
news from Facebook and about a third directly from Google.52 Despite this, we are not able to 
assess how these companies filter and rank news stories, as these are done by proprietary and 
opaque algorithms.53 As Moore states, “these, and other emerging services, give these 
information intermediaries a crucial role in determining what news citizens are exposed to (or 
 
Regulating New Media (Lieden: Brill, 2019).ß 
48 Woolley, “Introduction: Computational Propaganda Worldwide,” 4. 
49 Woolley, “Introduction: Computational Propaganda Worldwide,” 9. 
50 Woolley, “Introduction: Computational Propaganda Worldwide,” 10. 
51 Elizabeth Greico, “More Americans are Turning to Multiple Social Media Sites for News,” Pew Research Center, 
November 2, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/02/more-americans-are-turning-to-multiple-
social-media-sites-for-news/. 
52 Moore, “Tech Giants and Civic Power,” 31. 
53 Moore, “Tech Giants and Civic Power,” 33. 
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not exposed to), how diverse this news is, and how it is prioritized and filtered.”54  
On Facebook, the kinds of news stories people receive in their feed depends to a good 
extent on who their friends are; this can promote what are called ‘filer bubbles’ and ‘echo-
chambers’, in which people are exposed to a small number of viewpoints that tend to confirm the 
opinions they already hold.55 As Epstein states, platform companies foster selective exposure, 
which leads to  “situations where people become trapped in a digital echo chamber of 
information that confirms and strengthens their existing beliefs.”56 Stories are recommended to 
readers based upon their demonstrated habits and interests, leading them to receive more of the 
same kinds of stories. Despite the massive proliferation of information, the consolidation of 
media power by the tech companies means that people are actually receiving less information 
from fewer news sources.57 At the same time, there is less funding for original and investigative 
journalism, which leads to fewer and lower quality news stories.  
Filter bubbles are a civic danger in and of themselves, no matter the actual content of the 
news they contain, or whether the information they amplify and transmit is false. Part of the 
reason for this is the highly emotive and polarizing nature of junk news. Marchal found that junk 
news stories on Facebook were less prolific but more engaging, earning from 1.2 to 4 times as 
many likers and shares as credible news stories; this increased engagement is likely due to the 
highly emotive and often anger-provoking nature of the stories.58 Filter bubbles also reinforce 
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partisanship, which social media has pushed to unprecedented levels. As Khan states, “this 
certainty in the righteousness of our own point of view makes us regard a neighbor with a yard 
sign the way a Capulet regards a Montague. It seems to me that we suddenly hate each other a 
whole lot more than we ever did before.”59 Uncivil media makes civil hands unclean.  
Platform companies can have an outsized influence over not only the content that people 
are reading, but even over their ability – or not – to organize for political causes. As Moore 
states, “these organisations can give people a voice they can also take it away and, as commercial 
organizations, they do not need to say why. Given the dominance of these services, going to 
another service is often not a viable option.”60 Ethan Zuckerman points out that these are private 
platforms masquerading as public forums, which holds serious consequences for their increasing 
monopoly over political news and political communication. He states: 
Hosting your political movement on YouTube is a little like trying to hold a rally in a 
shopping mall. It looks like a public space, but it’s not – it’s a private space, and your 
use of it is governed by an agreement that works harder to protect YouTube’s fiscal 
viability than to protect your rights of free speech.61  
People and channels that express unpopular views can easily be ‘de-platformed’ from the public 
debate by private companies, either by limiting revenue streams or out-and-out content 
removal.62 This can be done with little transparency or recourse and, even if the service is later 
restored, the company’s action may have already altered the terms of the public debate at an 
opportune moment.  
 
59 Gabriel Kahn, “Facebook’s Self-Deception,” International Policy Digest, January 25, 2018, 
https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/01/25/facebook-s-self-deception/. 
60 Moore, “Tech Giants and Civic Power,” 44. 
61 Ethan Zuckerman, “Public Spaces, Private Infrastructure – Open Video Conference,” My Heart’s in Accra, 
October 1, 2010, http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2010/10/01/public-spaces-private-infrastructure-open-
video-conference/. 
62 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, “When Digital Platforms Become Censors,” Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2018, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-digital-platforms-become-censors-1534514122?mod=rsswn. 
 / TECHNOEMPIRE / 17 
 
There is a growing sense, particularly during election campaigns, that junk news – 
information that is “ideologically extreme, misleading, and factually incorrect” – is widespread 
and destructive of democratic functioning.63 As Neudert states, “[i]n Europe, groups at the fringe 
of the political spectrum successfully used fabricated falsehoods, conspiracy theories, and hate 
speech to mobilize voters and sow public discontent with political systems.”64 Because these 
platforms are now so large, it becomes all-too-easy for a platform to bury almost any needle into 
a trillion-byte haystack.65 Because these forms of information management are less visible, they 
can ‘nudge’ citizens into behaviour and beliefs that are more conducive to the authorities’ wishes 
but without provoking the anger or backlash that overt censorship would do.66 
Misinformation can be a very powerful influencer of people’s behaviour and opinions. The 
large platform companies have the ability to control what information people can access, 
interpret, and engage with, and this in turn leads to changes in opinions, behaviours, and even 
votes.67 Computational propaganda has been identified by the World Economic Forum as one of 
the top ten threats to democratic societies.68 Because many of these methods of spreading 
computational propaganda are new, we have yet to fashion the legal or governance mechanisms 
to come to terms with them. Despite the power that platform companies now command over the 
news, they are not accountable to the same laws and regulations that constitutions and national 
laws wield over regular media.69 Yet this is an area in which the dangers of state regulation are 
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equally great, as increasing state control over private communications may foster 
authoritarianism, and suppress free speech and open debate.  
 
4.2 Synthetic Media:  
Synthetic media – sometimes referred to as ‘deep fakes’ – use the power of machine learning and 
neural networks to create synthetic audio, photo, video, or even text media that appear authentic. 
One common example is video footage that has been altered to transpose one person’s speech, 
mannerisms, and movements onto that of another.70 Synthetic media now also include false e-
mails, texts or messages, some of which appear to be from friends who know you well.71 
Currently, video technology can only make changes to the face beneath the forehead; it cannot 
yet replace an entire body, but programmers are working on this, and the technology is 
progressing.72 Synthetic media is developing faster than technologies that detect it, making it 
nearly invisible and highly manipulative.  
Deep fakes are precicely calibrated to feed back into and reinforce existing ideological 
biases, beliefs, and prejudices. This spawns further social divisions and political partisanship. As 
Aviv Ovadya states, “In the wrong hands, synthetic media could deepen divisions in society – 
and in government – as it becomes difficult to tell what’s real and what isn’t.”73 In recent 
hearings by the Committee on Intelligence, the U.S. House of Representative stated that 
“Deepfakes raise profound questions about national security and democratic governance, with 
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individuals and voters no longer able to trust their own eyes or ears when assessing the 
authenticity of what they see on their screens.”74 Deepfakes are a particularly insidious form of 
computational propaganda, and they have the potential to inflame tensions between nations, 
endanger national security, and undermine foreign policy and international diplomacy.75 McBeth 
has even raised the possibility that an AI-engineered event could be so inflammatory as to launch 
an armed conflict.76 In a political climate of partisanship, high tensions, and a failure of non-
violent dispute-resolution mechanisms, this remains a possibility.  
There is evidence that synthetic videos are beginning to be used by political opponents, 
although to date these fakes have been relatively easy to detect. In one such video, posted by the 
Flemish Socialist Party of Belgium, U.S. President Donald Trump appears to criticize Belgium 
for remaining in the Paris climate accord.77 The Party told Politico that it created the video in 
order to start a public debate, and they were open about its falsity.78 Another video surfaced in 
May of 2019 by a Trump supporter which depicted Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the U.S. House 
of Representatives, appearing to deliver a speech while highly intoxicated. Again, the video was 
quickly debunked,79 but with media credibility at an all-time low, there will be many who prefer 
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to believe in the truth of the video anyways – to ‘debunk the debunking’ – and entrench existing 
biases.  
In 2018, deep fake photos were posted on conservative media sites depicting Parkland 
school shooting survivor and gun-control activist Emma Gonzalez.80 In the doctored photos, 
Gonzalez was shown wearing a Cuban flag on her jacket and ripping up the U.S. Constitution. 
These photos inflamed conservatives and Second Amendment aficionados, and in this case the 
photos were not quickly debunked as fakes. In one the original photos, Gonzalez is actually 
ripping up a shooting target, not the U.S. Constitution; more than this, the original photo 
appeared prominently in Teen Vogue as part of a cover story on school shootings.81 This shows 
just how deeply entrenched filter bubbles can be in such a vast and divided media landscape, and 
how easily even obvious synthetic media can go undetected and support political and social 
divisions.  
At the same time, the phenomena will surely arise whereby any public figure caught in an 
embarrassing or compromising act will simply claim it to be a deep fake, and blame it on an 
algorithm – a phenomenon that Citron has called the Liar’s Dividend, stating that the “more 
people are educated about the advent of deep fakes, the more they may disbelieve real 
recordings. Regrettably and perversely, the Liar’s Dividend grows in strength as people learn 
more about the dangers of deep fakes.”82  
Synthetic media therefore have the capacity to destroy social capital and credibility at its 
base, and this is equally true whether we accept their content as true or not. The more 
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fundamental problem is that we do not have any objective criteria to determine what is worthy of 
belief. Moreover, drawing attention to the phenomenon of synthetic media only reinforces its 
effects, leaving us no choice but to fall back on our preferences, prejudices, and political 
ideologies – exactly the opposite of what we need to reduce social discord and promote healthy 
civic engagement. 
Shamir Alibhai is the CEO of Amber, a company that embeds a watermark in videos at the 
time of their creation to assist in their authentication. Alibhai believes that authenticating media 
in this way is a matter of deep moral principle. He states that “a postfact world could undo much 
of the last century’s progress toward peace, stability and prosperity, driven in part by a belief in 
evidence-based conclusions.”83  Similarly, Aviv Ovadya states: 
More generally, synthetic media is a challenge to our epistemic capacity – our ability 
to make sense of the world and make competent decisions. Especially concerning is 
the growth of reality apathy – where people give up on determining real from fake – 
and reality sharding – where people selectively choose what to believe, forming 
deeper and deeper like-minded clusters.84 
This kind of ‘reality apathy,’ or ‘reality fatigue,’ is a symptom of eroding epistemic capacity and 
the credibility of core civic institutions – the media, politicians, public figures, academia. “Beset 
by a torrent of constant misinformation,” he states, “people simply start to give up.”85 
Reality apathy may lead to a fundamental loss in the credibility of social institutions, a 
crisis that Ovadya has termed the ‘infocalypse’86 – the point at which we realize that we lack 
standards for truth and accuracy, and that we have no control over fast-evolving technologies. 
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Ovadya states that “the stakes are high and the possible consequences more disastrous than 
foreign meddling in an election – an undermining or upending of core civilizational institutions, 
an ‘infocalypse’.”87  
 
4.3 The Search Engine Manipulation Effect (SEME):  
Algorithmic injustice includes a variety of inequalities and deprivations that stem from the 
operation of algorithms and machine-learning systems. This can include, for example, a tendency 
to be mis-identified by a facial recognition system because of one’s race, and other biases that 
are inherent in machine-learning systems and the way that information is presented to them 
during their learning process.88 Algorithmic injustices can promote bias and discrimination and 
can lead to differential access to goods and services. Since algorithms also control an increasing 
variety of security systems, they can also have an outsized impact on our privacy, on the security 
of our personal information, and our susceptibility to surveillance and data collection.  
Moreover, many of these risks are invisible, buried as they are inside impenetrable and 
proprietary algorithms – the so-called ‘black box’ that is a fundamental characteristic of 
machine-learning systems. As Jonathan Zittrain states, “most machine-learning systems don’t 
uncover causal mechanisms. They are statistical-correlation engines.” 89 They can’t – and so we 
can’t – explain why they make the findings that they do.90 As Epstein states, “Google decides 
which of the billions of web pages it is going to include in our search results, and it also decides 
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how to rank them. How it decides these things is a deep, dark secret.”91 Since these systems are 
largely independent from human knowledge and control, we cannot really know how or why 
they are operating the way they do, and so we cannot penetrate the black box to uncover the 
roots of systemic biases.  
All of these problems hold out significant risks for our democratic values and equality 
rights. In this paper, we will focus on only one form of algorithmic injustice as it poses especial 
risks to the democratic process. This is the search engine manipulation effect (SEME), and its 
ability to invisibly shape public opinion and sway election votes. The SEME refers to the strong 
preference that people have for the information that appears at the top of the search rankings. Not 
only do we click far more often on the highest-ranked results, but we find the information therein 
to be far more credible and persuasive, even though we have minimal knowledge of how the 
results are ranked.92  Google, either through its search engine or through its ownership of 
YouTube, controls what web sites and video content billions of people around the world see, and 
determines the timing of their access to this information.93 For Google, over 90% of all clicks are 
on the first page of search results – with fewer than 10% of users venturing on to the second page 
to find a link – and about half of all clicks are on the first- or second-ranked link alone.94 We 
have been conditioned to think of search engine results as being algorithmic, mathematical, and 
objective; this has led to powerful assumptions that the results at the top of the list are inherently 
trustworthy and more credible than those further down.95 
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SEME has been studied by Robert Epstein, Senior Research Psychologist at the American 
Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology.96 He finds that the effect of biased search 
rankings on voter behavior is greater than that of traditional media sources,97 and possesses an 
unprecedented ability to manipulate a significant portion of the world’s population.98 The 
problem is compounded by the virtual monopoly that Google has on search rankings, combined 
with the lack of transparency in their proprietary ranking methods serves to hide any bias or 
manipulation. Moreover, because Google can reach people at an unprecedented scale and at just 
the right time – such as during critical moments in election campaigns – this is a highly effective, 
and a wholly novel, form of social control.99 As Epstein also points out, many elections are won 
by rather small margins, so even minimal manipulation can have an outsized influence on results 
provided it is targeted at undecided voters at just the right time, often in the days leading up to an 
election.100  
One powerful form of election manipulation uncovered by Epstein is ‘digital 
gerrymandering.’101 This refers to the popular practice of campaigns getting people out to vote in 
the days leading up to an election. However, it is possible for a search engine to preferentially 
target these messages to supporters of only one campaign or candidate; because get-out-the-vote 
campaigns are so influential on election outcomes, even a small amount of targeted manipulation 
may be enough to swing a close election.102  
It is also possible for a search engine to preferentially target undecided voters, and voters 
from particularly vulnerable groups. Using information collected from online profiles, the search 
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engine can then target timely messages to these groups; such manipulation can be highly biased, 
yet undetectable by regulators.103 As Epstein states, “restricting search ranking manipulations to 
voters who have been identified as undecided while also donating money to favored candidates 
would be an especially subtle, effective, and efficient way of wielding influence.”104 Google’s 
autocomplete is also highly manipulative – these suggestions “can turn a 50/50 split among 
undecided voters into a 90/10 split,” without people even being aware they are being 
manipulated.105 
Yet another form of the SEME is referred to as the ‘digital bandwagon’ effect, which 
happens when one candidate or campaign gets pushed higher in the search engine rankings; this 
endows the candidate with a veneer of credibility and popularity that quickly overshadows and 
crowds-out other candidates and points of view.106 This results in a feedback loop that continues 
to magnify the effect, described by Epstein as “the process by which search rankings affect voter 
preferences might interact synergistically with the process by which voter preferences affect 
search rankings, thus creating a sort of digital bandwagon effect that magnifies the potential 
impact of even minor search ranking manipulations.”107 
Not only is SEME powerful, but individuals appear to be particularly powerless to resist it 
– and this is true even when people are informed that the effect is taking place and the search 
rankings they are viewing are biased. As Epstein explains:  
SEME is one of the most powerful forms of influence ever discovered in the behavioral 
sciences, and it is especially dangerous because it is invisible to people – “subliminal,” 
in effect. It leaves people thinking they have made up their own minds, which is very 
much an illusion. It also leaves no paper trail for authorities to trace. Worse still, the 
very few people who can detect bias in search results shift even farther in the direction 
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of the bias, so merely being able to see the bias doesn’t protect you from it. Bottom 
line: biased search results can easily produce shifts in the opinions and voting 
preference of undecided voters by 20 percent or more – up to 80 percent in some 
demographic groups.108 
Action against the SEME therefore must be calibrated to deal with its psychological effects, 
otherwise the measures taken will not work, or may even exacerbate the effect. 
 Epstein states that Google’s control over information through search-engine rankings will 
continue to influence election results around the world: 
Robertson and I calculated that Google now has the power to flip upwards of 25 per 
cent of the national elections in the world with no one knowing this is occurring. In 
fact, we estimate that, with or without deliberate planning on the part of company 
executives, Google’s search rankings have been impacting elections for years, with 
growing impact each year. And because search rankings are ephemeral, they leave 
no paper trail, which gives the company complete deniability.109 
Unchecked, then, search engine manipulation can impact democracy at its foundations – even if 
one’s preferred party, position, or candidate prevails110 – because it makes election results a 
consequence of manipulation by powerful actors and not the freely-expressed choices of voters. 
In fact, there is evidence that search-engine manipulations are already affecting people’s choices, 
purchasing behaviours, habits, beliefs, and voting preferences worldwide, without a good deal of 
conscious awareness or reflection that this is occurring.111 
 
5. Regulating Technological Threats to Civil Society 
5.1 Introduction: Towards a New Regulatory Framework: 
We have yet to devise effective methods to hold platforms accountable for computational 
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propaganda, or address algorithmic transparency.112 Empowering states to control companies, 
and limit the user-generated content they post, is not necessarily an effective response. The 
danger exists that empowering the state to control platform companies will only increase the 
state’s power to wield computational propaganda as a tool of economic, political, and foreign 
policy.113 Regulatory solutions need to empower users – not organizations, companies, or 
states.114  
To date, platform companies have responded to criticisms over the spread of 
misinformation by exerting more control over content on their platforms. Several platforms have 
introduced tools, for example, to control content, to filter news, to moderate user participation, 
and have put in place more and more mechanisms to demonetize or remove outright content that 
violates – what are often vague and opaque – terms of use. As Moore states: 
[T]his type of collaboration, of democratic states working closely with corporations 
that have such detailed knowledge of the minutiae of our political and social lives, 
raises a rather frightening prospect that neither George Orwell or Aldous Huxley fully 
imagined. A world in which governments have access to all our digital information 
and communication, and therefore almost complete knowledge of who we are, who 
we communicate with, and how we engage with politics – not only via their own 
systems but via those run by the information intermediaries. In addition to which, by 
outsourcing its means of surveillance and control there are few democratic 
mechanisms of transparency or accountability, with many citizens blithely unaware it 
is even happening[.]115 
If powerful interest assume control over platform companies and their content, whether this be 
governmental or corporate power, this has the potential to lead only to “the obscene power to 
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decide what information humanity can see and how that information should be ordered.”116 
Platform companies are already able to wield power over content in ways that contradict 
their users’ interests. Twitter, for example has allowed mainstream news producers to publish 
disturbing yet newsworthy footage, while it has banned ordinary users who wish to publish 
similar material.117 Platform companies have also shown great deference to local laws, even 
illiberal laws that suppress speech. Twitter filters content by country, and abides by local laws 
restricting free speech.118  
Since the 2016 U.S. election, over 40 countries around the world have passed or proposed 
new laws to deal with “fake news, social media abuse, and election interference.”119 Many of 
these laws empower tech companies to control content, and thereby also empower governments 
to suppress free speech and consolidate their own authoritarianism. The same is true for 
regulatory measures that seek to criminalize disinformation.120 Several countries have now 
criminalized even the sharing of content vaguely termed “disinformation,” including several 
authoritarian countries with poor human rights records and a lack of due process; these include 
Iran, Kuwait, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Tanzania.121 Other countries 
have expanded their definitions of illegal content, and passed laws to strengthen their control 
over the media.122  
At the same time, allowing platform companies to govern themselves runs the risk that 
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they will simply introduce initiatives that impair public regulatory responses. As Gorwa states, 
“since 2016, platform companies have implemented multiple changes in response to public 
concern. These initiatives, which range from new advertising tools to changes as to how they 
interact with political campaigns, seem designed to head off possible avenues of regulation while 
also effectively maintaining the highly-profitable status quo.”123  
Self-governance measures undertaken by companies may not be transparent, accessible, or 
fair to users. Klein states that criticisms of fake news have led many advertising companies to 
update their policies “to deny services to fake news publishers.”124 In this way, accounts or 
revenue can be terminated with little warning or justification. This is already leading to a 
backlash. There may be lawsuits by those who are de-platformed and de-monetized, thereby 
forcing companies to go back and specify clear and justifiable criteria in their contractual terms. 
As we argue above in the discussion of Microsoft and Backpage, we need not choose 
between the freedom of companies to distribute content on the one hand, and the power of states 
to regulate and suppress this content on the other. To do so only feeds back into the clash of 
empires. As Neudert states, “the debate on computational propaganda itself has become a highly 
politicized proxy war.”125 The European Commission states in its recent report on combatting 
disinformation, “[a]ny form of censorship either public or private should clearly be avoided.”126  
We can and should choose regulatory options that respect fundamental rights. Accordingly, 
neither governments nor platform companies should be allowed to interfere with editorial 
content.127 Instead, we can implement methods of governance that increase resilience to 
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disinformation,128 and enhance transparency and accountability for the sources of information, its 
funding, and its credibility and reliability.129 The human and civil rights laws that are already in 
place provide the basic legal and ethical framework for the future of platform governance, 
emphasizing the values of fairness, accountability, transparency, ethics. This is what shifts power 
and legal rights back to technology users, as both consumers and citizens.130  
In the following section, we propose three organizing principles that can be used to direct 
regulatory responses to computational propaganda: 1) there should be informational 
transparency, including for algorithms and information flows;  2) power should be decentralized, 
and greater user control should be promoted; and 3) there should be a focus on efforts to improve 
media literacy, fact-checking and credibility. These principles are all linked, and together we 
propose that they are better able to deal with some of the specific harms of computational 
propaganda while also promoting democratic values, human rights, and civic engagement. 
 
5.2 Transparency: 
Transparency is a key principle in regulating platform companies and the spread of 
computational propaganda. Transparency is about enabling users to easily access relevant 
information, so that they can make their own determinations about the quality of the content, its 
credibility, and any sources of bias. Transparency also means algorithmic transparency, so that 
users can get information on how and why they are receiving certain material, or why 
information has been presented or recommended to them.131 This also includes transparency over 
when bots or other technological means are being used to artificially inflate the apparent 
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popularity of a piece of information.132 Focusing on transparency is a superior method of 
regulation than content controls, as it promotes the flow of relevant information, avoids 
censorship, and empowers users.  
  One example of regulation through transparency is the effort to inform users about the 
sources of funding for political advertising, and foreign funding of domestic political 
campaigns.133 As Bradshaw states, “Some government initiatives focus on monitoring the 
information ecosystem and providing users with portals to report misinformation. At a regional 
level, The East StratCom Task Force provides monitoring, training, and capacity building for 
disinformation campaigns that affect European Union institutions and member state 
governments.”134 Italy, too, has begun a national monitoring initiative, and has “established a 
monitoring portal citizen can use to report instances of fake news for investigation in the run up 
to the next election.”135 
 Another example of promoting transparency is alerting users to biases in search engine 
results, which has been shown to suppress the effects of the search-engine manipulation effect. It 
has been shown that about 8% of users will detect bias in search engine results without any 
warnings, but that about 25% of users will detect bias with a warning; this has been shown to be 
fairly consistent across experiments.136  
 Promoting transparency also involves opening up some of the impenetrable and proprietary 
algorithms and methods of data analyses that companies have to date kept hidden. As The 
European Commission states in its recent Report on disinformation: 
Transparency of algorithms is also needed for integrity of elections and this cannot be 
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conducted without data checking. This could be done by requiring platforms to use 
open application programming interface, that does not reveal the algorithm but its 
results. This would allow third parties to build software for data checking to monitor 
effects. Twitter, for instance, is making its open API available to many organizations 
and small research groups.137 
In this way, transparency is closely linked to the next regulatory domain, which consists of 
methods that decentralize information and information control, and that put more power into 
the hands of users.  
 
5.3 Decentralization & User Control: 
One of the most important principles in a framework for regulating platform companies is to 
decentralize control out of the hands of large players – the companies themselves, the 
governments who have the power to regulate them, and even influential organizations and NGOs 
– and into the hands of end users. User control includes control over algorithms, 
recommendations and filtering, as well as over generating and accessing content, and 
information about potential biases about content.  
The European Commission has put forth a number of proposals to increase user control: 
This may include the development of built-in tools/plug-ins and applications for 
browsers and smartphones, to empower users to better control access to digital 
information. In particular, platforms should consider ways to encourage users’ control 
over the selection of the content to be displayed as results of a search and/or in news 
feeds. Such system should give to the user the opportunity to have content displayed 
according to quality signals. Moreover, content recommendation systems that expose 
different sources and different viewpoints around trending topics should be made 
available to users in online platforms.138 
It can be seen that many of these controls are linked to measures of transparency we discussed in 
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the section above, showing how closely linked these domains are, and how beneficial changes in 
one domain can support and reinforce benefits in the other.  
 Co-governance, or shared governance, is another option that has been proposed. Gorwa 
recommends a co-governance model, which involves cooperation between technology 
companies and third-party organizations whose responsibility is to improve ethics and 
accountability:  
Civil society organizations, for example, have advocated for some kind of organization 
that could perform multiple functions ranging from investigating user complaints to 
creating ethical frameworks for platform companies, perhaps modelled after 
international press councils which set codes of conduct and standards for news 
organizations.139  
One of the advantages of co-governance is that it can shift power to control content away from 
companies and towards civil society organizations. Such organizations may be given the power 
to identify and label content, to provide information about possible sources of bias, partisan 
funding, and credibility concerns. Independent third-party organizations might even be employed 
to assess complaints against platform providers.140 The downsides of co-governance are that it 
empowers organizations over individuals and end-users. Although co-governance can be 
beneficial in some instances – such as promoting infrastructure for fact-checking, content-
assessment, and complaints mechanisms – it might also work against individual interests. One 
such organization, NewsGuard, was being employed to assess the credibility of new sources but 
instead has its own biases and partisan sources of funding exposed by those same news 
organizations.141 This shows the dangers of empowering third-party organizations, since their 
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own transparency, credibility, and biases, can be very difficult to assess.  
 Another, more radical, method of promoting decentralization and user control is to declare 
search engine indexes, certain databases, and even some algorithms to be part of the public 
commons. Epstein, for example, has proposed the break-up of Google’s monopoly by declaring 
its search index to be a public commons. He states that we should declare: 
Google’s massive search index – the database the company uses to generate search 
results – to be a public commons, accessible by all, just as a 1956 consent decree forced 
AT&T to share all its patents. There is precedent in both law and in Google’s own 
business practices to justify taking this step.142 
Google may have gathered the content, and developed ways to index and search it, but that 
content was generated by users, and they should have control over how it is used.143  
Search indices like Google’s could be shared with third parties through an application 
programming interface, or API, much as Google already does with Startpage, a Dutch 
company.144 Moving control over at least some digital functions into the public sphere is a more 
effective way to promote competition among search indices than are anti-trust actions, such as 
those taken against Microsoft. This could serve to break-up the search engine market and 
promote competition. As Epstein states: 
Declaring Google’s index a commons will quickly give rise to thousands of search 
platforms like Google.com, each competing with Google, each providing excellent 
search results, each serving niche audiences, large and small, exactly like newspapers 
and television networks and websites do now. Search will become competitive, as it 
was during its early years, and democracy will be protected from Google’s secretive 
machinations.145 
As with all competition, this could promote real alternatives to Google, as it would create 
 
142 Epstein, “Why Google Poses a Serious Threat to Democracy,” 5. 
143 Epstein, “To Break Google’s Monopoly on Search.” 
144 Epstein, “To Break Google’s Monopoly on Search.” 
145 Epstein, “Why Google Poses a Serious Threat to Democracy,” 5. 
 / TECHNOEMPIRE / 35 
 
“thousands of search platforms, each with its special focus and emphasis, each drawing on 
different subsets of information from Google’s ever-expanding index, and each using different 
rules to decide how to organize the search results they display.”146 
Search engines open to the public via an API can thereby give users control over their 
search preferences, and this promotes competition as well as user satisfaction. Startpage doesn’t 
track users’ online activities, and so does not give personalized results like Google does, but it 
better maintains users’ privacy.147 With competition, Google may have to service its customer’s 
interests, and even reign in some of its unpopular forms of surveillance.148 This is one reason 
why search engines like Google may wish to adopt these methods, before they lose more search 
traffic to privacy and security-conscious sites, such as Duck-Duck-Go. Epstein argues that it may 
even be in Google’s best interests to devolve some control into the commons, as it would avoid 
the more damaging scenario of having its assets seized, fined, or frozen by a government.149  
Devolving some of the assets of technology companies into the commons is a regulatory 
option in Europe. Under European competition law, and its ‘essential facility doctrine,’ a 
dominant firm may be required to share its assets if the asset is essential or indispensable for 
others to compete effectively in the marketplace, and if refusing this access “would eliminate 
effective competition on that market and thus cause consumer harm.”150 There is also some 
precedent for this, as the European Commission has previously held that “Google has abused its 
market dominance as a search engine by giving an illegal advantage to another Google product, 
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its comparison shopping service.”151 This was found to be a breach of EU antitrust rules. 
 
5.4 Enncing Media Literacy & Credibility: 
Educating users comprises a number of related matters – not only on media literacy, the 
standards of good journalism, and assessing sources of media bias, but also in promoting 
independent fact-checking organizations, and measures to assess and enhance media credibility. 
Efforts to educate and promote media literacy and credibility work together with the other two 
domains of regulation, as they promote user control as well as the transparency of information, 
its sources, and its funding.  
Media literacy is an important component of regulating platform companies, but it must be 
specifically designed to address computational propaganda. Many technological forms of 
manipulation are psychologically powerful because they work in concert with our existing 
psychological biases. Education will be most effective if it specifically targets these effects. 
Attaching bias or other warnings to content may not be effective in and of itself. Pennycook et 
al. have shown that it may even have the opposite effect, such that “attaching warnings to 
headlines that have been flagged by third-party fact-checkers as disputed or unreliable in some 
way can have a negative effect such that readers see untagged headlines as somehow being more 
reliable, or having been validated.”152 The authors term this the “implied truth effect.”153 
Attaching quality signals to information may only have a beneficial effect on users’ perceptions 
if unflagged and unverified materials are also identified as such.  
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The European Commission has also suggested that personalized content-filtering be 
programmed so as to facilitate “the display online of the widest possible range of relevant news 
and information to consumers.”154 Algorithms that recommend content should ensure that users 
are exposed to a greater, rather than a lesser, variety of content and viewpoints. This may address 
the growth and entrenchment of online filter bubbles. To ensure that the recommended sources 
are themselves not biased, they can be generated by a randomizing function. To ensure that this 
doesn’t violate the principle of facilitating user control, users should always be able to opt out in 
their preferences.  
Aviv Ovadya, through his Thoughtful Technology Project, has put together a framework 
that seeks to build the credibility of information sources. Credibility in this context means more 
than just accuracy in terms of factual content, but refers more broadly to information that 
improves our accurate understanding of the world and provides a basis for making sound 
decisions; misleading information, in Ovadya’s framework, is that which decreases the accuracy 
of our beliefs about the world and the effectiveness of our decisions.155 Efforts to promote 
credibility include increased media literacy, research, and funding for fact-checkers and other 
media verification specialists who, unlike NewsGuard, are independent and trustworthy.156 
Broad-based efforts at media literacy should begin from a young age.157 This also means training 
for teachers and resources for curriculum development,158 and for parents and libraries, as well. 
Europe needs to fund research, fact-checking, media literacy, as well as funding independent 
news media and training journalists, and de-emphasize government initiatives.159 “The final 
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goal,” states Ovadya, “should be the creation of an open market for fact-checking that avoids a 
‘monopoly of truth,’ which could be potentially abused in some countries and might not carry 
public approval in other countries.”160 
 
6. Conclusion: 
As we write, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has put out a call 
for potential partners to develop their Semantic Forensics Program (SemaFor).161 SemaFor will 
develop semantic detection algorithms to identity misinformation or manipulated and synthetic 
media, such as text, news, photos, and videos; attribution algorithms will identify the 
organizations and individuals who are the sources of the information, and other algorithms will 
stop the spread of the information for the purposes of helping to “identify, understand, and deter 
adversary disinformation campaigns.”162 This is a good example of an approach to media 
regulation that is not in keeping with the framework we proposed. First, it uses technological 
means, namely code, to solve what is essentially a problem involving social relations, critical 
thinking, and political values. Second, it proposes content controls to direct and limit the 
transmission of even lawful expressions. Third, it violates the core regulatory goals we have 
described here: it is not transparent – its algorithms will operate invisibly and are able to identify 
and remove content without users being aware; it takes control over information away from 
individuals, and centralizes it in the hands of the U.S. military; it spreads fear about the 
dangerousness of the media and information from vaguely-defined adversaries, sows distrust in 
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the government for secretly removing access to lawful content, and it forces people to go outside 
of the mainstream to access news and information – this only encourages filter bubbles and 
access to misinformation and fake news. 
  We have proposed here a regulatory framework that is intended to maintain human rights 
and freedom of speech, promote competition and decentralization, and devolve power and 
control onto individuals as consumers, citizens, and technology users. This approach to Internet 
governance emphasizes goals, desired outcomes, and civic values – including political 
autonomy, open debate and freedom of expression. At the same time, this framework gives us 
governance mechanisms that are more effective in responding to the threats posed by the power 
of technology companies and the spread of computational propaganda.   
 In the 13th century, the leaders of the Abbasid empire, in their hubris, did not think that 
they were vulnerable to a Mongol invasion; they failed to respond adequately to the threat, and 
their empire – a cultural triumph centuries old – fell quickly. We should not allow our own 
governments to take ineffective measures against computational propaganda and the 
monopolistic power of technology companies. Nor should we allow our governments, in their 
hubris, to think that they can control the tech companies and the public narrative in order to shore 
up their own power. They can’t. But in attempting to do so they can limit our basic freedoms, 
exacerbate social discord, and drive an ever-increasing number of people to seek out information 
sources farther from the mainstream – sources that lack credibility and that promote 
misinformation and conspiracy theories. The problem at hand is not one of technology, and it can 
only be solved by building trust in media sources and social institutions, ensuring that their 
credibility is deserved, and by promoting political autonomy, critical thinking, and the free flow 
of information. The Internet is an unprecedented vehicle for promoting education, spreading 
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knowledge, and facilitating social relationships and political associations. This outcome, 
however, is not inevitable – it depends on the approach we take to governing the Internet and the 
spread of information. If we allow the Internet to be caught up in a monumental clash of empires, 
it, too, can come crashing down in a heartbeat.  
* * *  
